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DYING TO GET AWAY WITH IT: HOW THE
ABATEMENT DOCTRINE THWARTS JUSTICEAND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE INSTEAD
Timothy A. Razel*
INTRODUCTION

In December 2001, Ken Horton left the headquarters of Enron
Corporation, personal items in hand, for the final time. 1 Like many of the
thousands of newly laid-off employees who left the bankrupt company at
that time, he felt "betrayed by ...

[the] company he loved."'2

One of

Horton's regrets about his overall positive Enron experience was his
investment strategy. 3 "'If I had to do it all over again, I would work at
Enron again,' he said. 'I just would have invested a little differently.-' 4
Due to the spectacular collapse of Enron in 2001, Horton incurred a sixfigure loss from his retirement account, which was loaded with Enron
5
stock.
Thanks to a scheme concocted by Kenneth L. Lay, Chief Executive
Officer of Enron, and other company executives, Enron's stock had been
kept artificially high between 1998 and early 2001.6 Enron executives
accomplished this feat by using various accounting tricks to conceal over $7
billion in losses. 7 However, on October 22, 2001, the scheme began to
crumble as Enron admitted it was under inquiry by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for possible conflicts of interest related to

* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2008. I would like to thank my good
friend Adam S. Wilcox for inspiring me to write about this topic. Thank you also to
Professor Daniel Richman, my advisor, as well as my parents Barb and Tony and my sister
Melissa for always being there for me.
1. Frank Ahrens, From the Ex-employees: Revenge, Shock, Sadness, Wash. Post, May
26, 2006, at D1.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Superseding Indictment 21, United States v. Causey, 2004 WL 1553217 (S.D.
Tex. 2004) (Cr. No. H-04-25). According to the Superseding Indictment, Lay and others
engaged in various tactics including fraudulently overvaluing assets, making "false and
misleading statements" about the company's true financial condition, and hiding losses in
two subsidiary companies, Enron Broadband Services and Enron Energy Services. Id. 28.
7. Id. 24, 28.
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two partnerships, 8 which the conspirators used to hide losses. 9 After credit
rating agencies downgraded Enron's rating, top Enron officials announced
that they had overstated their income for the previous three-and-a-half years
by $586 million.' 0 Enron finally crashed when a merger agreement with a
rival failed and its rating was reduced to "junk status." 11 On December 2,
2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and its stock was rendered
worthless. 12
As a result of this scheme, Ken Lay netted approximately $217 million in
income from sales of artificially inflated Enron stock, as well as $19 million
in salary. 13 Also as a result of this scheme, unwitting former Enron
employee Adam Plager lost his 401 (k) plan, which, like Horton's retirement
account, had been buoyed by seemingly invincible Enron stock. 14 Plager
and Horton were merely two of "thousands of employees and millions of
15
stockholders" who had lost big money from this scheme.
The Justice Department brought various fraud-related charges against
Lay. 16 He was found guilty on May 25, 2006, of all ten counts of the
indictment. 17 When he heard about the guilty verdicts, Horton told the
Washington Post he was "in such an excellent mood."' 18 He was right to be
happy. Even though sentencing had not yet occurred (it was scheduled for
October 23),19 it was likely that the sentence would include restitution of
"tens of millions of dollars" unlawfully obtained by Lay to victims like
Plager and Horton. 20 That would be the justice that Lay's victims believed
they deserved.

8. Timeline
of
Enron's Collapse, Wash.
Post,
Sept.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25624-2002JanI 0.html.
9. Superseding Indictment, supra note 6,
28-33.
10. Id. 26.

30,

2004,

11. Id.
12. Id.; Timeline of Enron's Collapse,supra note 8.

13. Superseding Indictment, supra note 6, 16.
14. Ahrens, supra note 1. The stock had reached the height of $90 per share in August
2000. Id.

15. United States' Opposition to the Motion of the Estate of Lay to Vacate His
Conviction and Dismiss the Indictment at 1, United States v. Skilling, Cr. No. H-04-25 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Opposition to the Motion to Vacate], available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/govemment-abatement-motio
n-response.pdf.
16. See United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 870 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (granting

motion to abate). The charges included conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud, wire
fraud involving false and misleading statements in employee meetings, securities fraud
involving presentations to securities analysts and rating agency representatives, bank fraud,
and making false statements to banks. Id.
17. Opposition to the Motion to Vacate, supra note 15, at 1.

18. Ahrens, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. See Tom Fowler, Lay Case: It's Not Over: ProsecutorsSeek a New Law to Keep
His Conviction Alive, Despite His Death, Houston Chron., Sept. 7, 2006, at AI.
20. See Opposition to the Motion to Vacate, supra note 15, at 1. A victim is entitled to

restitution if he or she is harmed by the commission of a federal crime under the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 201-211, 110 Stat. 1214,
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However, that justice was about to be put in grave jeopardy. On July 5,
2006, Ken Lay died of a heart attack. 2 1 His lawyers then moved to invoke a
Fifth Circuit precedent that calls for the vacation of the conviction of any
22
defendant who dies before having an opportunity to pursue an appeal.
The doctrine is called abatement ab initio, or simply "abatement. ' 23 Its
effect is to stop all proceedings ab initio (from the beginning) and render
the defendant as if he or she had never been charged. 24 Since judgment had
not yet been entered, and sentencing had not yet occurred, Lay had no
opportunity to appeal. 2 5 Arguing that "the Lay Estate should not be
unjustly enriched with the proceeds of fraud," the government opposed the
motion. 26 It acknowledged that victims or the government could file a civil
action against the estate to have such proceeds disgorged, but that would
require the plaintiffs to prove the entire case all over again (albeit at a lower
27
burden of proof) and spend years in litigation.
The government requested that the court delay ruling on the motion until
October 23, the date of sentencing, so it could convince Congress to pass a
law which would retroactively preserve Lay's conviction. 28 No one came
forward to sponsor the legislation, which was sent to then-Speaker of the
House of Representatives Dennis Hastert and Vice President Dick
29
Cheney.
With no action from Congress, on October 17, 2006, Judge Sim Lake
rendered an order abating Lay's conviction. 30 Judge Lake acknowledged
that the "Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the abatement rule,"
31
and thus he was compelled to abate the proceedings against Lay.
In its opposition to the abatement order, the government pointed out that
many states have begun to question their previous use of the doctrine, with
some recently overturning precedent and choosing an alternative doctrine. 32

1227-41 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2000)). For further discussion, see
infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
21. Purva Patel & My-Thuan Tran, No Sponsorfor ProposedLay Bill, Houston Chron.,
Sept. 8, 2006, at D1.

22. See Fowler, supra note 19. For an example of the relevant case law, see United
States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
23. See Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 413; Opposition to the Motion to Vacate, supra
note 15, at 3.
24. See Estate of Parsons,367 F.3d at 413.
25. United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 874 (S.D. Tex. 2006). Technically,
because judgment had not yet been entered, there was no conviction to appeal. See id.
However, the rule may be invoked after a guilty verdict regardless of whether judgment had
yet been entered. Id. (citing United States v. Asset, 990 F.2d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1993)); see
also United States v. Oberlin, 718 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1983).
26. Opposition to the Motion to Vacate, supra note 15, at 2.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id. at 2. For details about the legislation, see id. at 4-7. For the text, see id.
attachment A.
29. Patel & Tran, supra note 21.
30. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 875.
31. Id.
32. Opposition to the Motion to Vacate, supra note 15, at 4 (noting several examples).
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The purpose of this Note is to examine the transition from the nearly
universal use of abatement to the many methods modem courts use to
dispose of cases such as Lay's. This Note also advocates for the adoption
of the approach that produces the fairest result.
Part I discusses the traditional doctrine of abatement and provides a
historical overview that tracks the development of the law regarding
abatement. This includes a discussion about the changes in the rationale
behind criminal law that accompanied the change in policy. It then
articulates the various competing interests that the doctrine of abatement
affects.
Part II provides an analysis of each of the five alternative abatement
doctrines (as set out by the Maryland Supreme Court in Surland v. State33).
It discusses the arguments for and against each method in light of the
various interests at stake.
Part III recommends a new approach, one that properly balances all of
the interests involved. This new approach recognizes that not all cases are
the same-there are variable interests of differing intensities in each. Part
III also includes a discussion of other advantages to the new approach, as
well as its disadvantages.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF ABATEMENT

A. The TraditionalDoctrine
1. What Is Abatement?
Abatement is the dismissal or discontinuance of a legal proceeding "for a
reason unrelated to the merits of the claim." 34 It is available in both the
civil context 35 and the criminal context. 36 Traditionally, the death of a
criminal defendant following conviction, but before an appeal can be made,
is a ground for abatement. 37 The effect of abatement is to discontinue all
proceedings ab initio-dismiss the appeal as moot, overturn the conviction,
and dismiss the indictment. 38
Essentially, the defendant is left as if he or
39
she had never been charged.

33. 895 A.2d 1034 (Md. 2006).

34. Black's Law Dictionary 1 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
35. See 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 1 (2006) (In the civil context,
abatement is a mechanism by which the defendant can stop a suit against him either
permanently or temporarily because of some procedural defect).
36. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eisen, 334 N.E.2d 14, 14 (Mass. 1975).

38. United States v. Schuster, 778 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir. 1985); see also supra notes
22-25 and accompanying text.
39. See United States v. Schumann, 861 F.2d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 1988); Rosanna
Cavallaro, Better Off Dead: Abatement, Innocence and the Evolving Right of Appeal, 73 U.

Colo. L. Rev. 943, 951 (2002).
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These effects of abatement have some significant legal consequences.
Since the conviction no longer exists, it cannot be used in a civil suit related
to the criminal activity. 40 Any uncollected fines generally cannot be
collected from the estate. 4 1 Restitution is a more controversial issue-some
courts that use abatement eliminate restitution and others preserve
restitution orders. 42 However, any restitution already paid by the defendant
43

may not be recovered.
Abatement is generally not used except in cases where defendants die
awaiting direct appeal. If the defendant dies appealing the denial of a
petition for habeas corpus, 44 or during other collateral proceedings, 4 5 the

proceedings will usually be dismissed but the conviction will remain intact.
The United States Supreme Court will dismiss a petition for certiorari
which is pending when the defendant dies. 46 Likewise, it will even dismiss
47
a petition for certiorari that has been granted.

Courts are split on the issue of whether the cause of death is relevant.
Some courts view the defendant's death by suicide as a decision to
intentionally forego "the appeals procedure which he knew would have
been available to him."'48 Thus, they will not invoke abatement and instead
50
let the conviction stand. 49 Other courts maintain that suicide is irrelevant.
5
1
One cannot "waive" the abatement doctrine by killing oneself.
Further,

such a distinction unjustifiably forces the courts to conduct "an exhaustive
'52
examination of the circumstances of death."
2. Sources of Authority for Abatement Doctrine
Where do courts get the authority to abate convictions?

In the federal

53
judicial system it is not mandated by the Constitution or federal statute.

40. United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684, 684 (5th Cir. 1980).
41. Id. However, any fines already paid into the court are not refundable; this is
analogous to time served in prison, which similarly cannot be refunded. United States v.
Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1346-47 (7th Cir. 1997).
42. Compare, e.g., United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1984)
(determining that restitution is preserved), with United States v. Logal, 106 F.3d 1547, 1552
(1 th Cir. 1997) (determining that restitution is eliminated).
43. United States v. Asset, 990 F.2d 208, 214 (5th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004).
44. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 559 So. 2d 320, 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. De La Zerda, 619 N.E.2d 617, 618-19 (Mass. 1993)
(reviewing an appeal of denial of motion for new trial); Keeny v. State, 575 S.W.2d 850,
850-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (en banc) (reviewing an appeal of denial of writ of error coram
nobis).
46. See Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325, 325 (1976) (per curiam).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 507 U.S. 545, 545 (1993) (mem.).
48. United States v. Chin, 633 F. Supp. 624, 627 (E.D. Va. 1986).
49. See, e.g., id. at 628.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Oberlin, 718 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1983).
51. Id.
52. State v. McDonald, 405 N.W.2d 771, 773-74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (Sundby, J.,
concurring), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1988).
53. United States v. Rorie, 58 M.J. 399, 405-06 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has not held that abatement is required in the
federal system but rather has "allowed the scope of the abatement to be
determined by the lower federal courts."' 54 It merely instructs that the lower
55
court dispose of the case "as law and justice require."
Thus, abatement in the federal system is a "matter of policy" for each
court. 56 In state courts, similarly, abatement is not constitutionally or
statutorily compelled but is rather a matter of common law. 57 Some state
legislatures, however, have created legislative policy that
has influenced the
58
development of the abatement doctrine in those states.
B. The Development of the Abatement Doctrine
1. Origins
The origins of the abatement doctrine are unclear. There is little
historical writing about the doctrine before the nineteenth century.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the earliest American cases
dealing with the question generally treated abatement as the obvious course
of action when a defendant died. In List v. Pennsylvania,59 the Supreme
Court acknowledged that the defendant had died and ordered abatement and
dismissal of the writ of error. Its sole rationale was that "it appear[s] ...
that this is a criminal case." 60 In an 1879 case, March v. State,6 1 the Texas
Court of Appeals held that a criminal proceeding was still "pending" while
an appeal was being taken. 62 Because the defendant had died before the
54. Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 482 (1971) (per curiam), overruled on other
grounds by Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976) (per curiam); see also Crooker v.
United States, 325 F.2d 318, 320 (8th Cir. 1963) ("These statements [from various Supreme
Court cases on abatement] would seem to intend no implication on what the scope of the
abatement was which had occurred, but to leave that matter entirely to the lower
courts ...").
55. Durham, 401 U.S. at 482 (internal quotation marks omitted); e.g., Singer v. United
States, 323 U.S. 338, 346 (1945). In state cases, the Court will simply dismiss the
proceeding without instruction. See, e.g., Gersewitz v. New York, 326 U.S. 687, 687 (1945)
(mem.), cited in Durham, 401 U.S. at 482.
56. Rorie, 58 M.J. at 405. This policy can of course be changed by statute, which the
Justice Department has recently tried to convince Congress to do, with little success. See
supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461, 463 (Ala. 2005) (per curiam) (discussing
whether the court's ability to reject the abatement doctrine is barred by stare decisis); People
v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 664 (Ill. 1999) (rejecting an opportunity to discard the doctrine
because abatement "has been the law ...for over twenty years").
58. See, e.g., State v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, 1003 (N.M. 1997) (citing a New Mexico
statute that allows for substitution of a party to pursue the appeal of a dead defendant); State
v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 972 (Haw. 1995) (per curiam) (construing Hawaii Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rule 43(a), to allow for substitution of a party to pursue the appeal).
59. 131 U.S. 396, 396 (1888) (mem.).
60. Id.
61. 5 Tex. Ct. App. 450 (1879).
62. Id. at 453 ("We are of opinion that.., the case is pending so long as the question of
the guilt or innocence of the accused remains undetermined ....
").
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appeal was decided, the court declared, without citation to authority, that
"the prosecution abate[d] in toto" because the proceeding was still
pending. 63 In O'Sullivan v. People,64 the Illinois Supreme Court took the
view that "[a] judgment cannot be enforced when the only subject-matter
upon which it can operate has ceased to exist."' 65 The court thus refused to
66
punish the dead defendant.
Interestingly, some states have never used abatement. Connecticut is one
state that decided against abatement. 67 In 1971, the Connecticut Supreme
Court was first presented with the issue, and declined to decide whether to
adopt abatement, because arguments for the rule were "neither briefed nor
argued before [it]. '' 68 It decided that the appeal was to be "dismissed as
moot."'69 Later cases continued to dismiss appeals as moot, without abating
70
the conviction, citing the 1971 case as authority.
Georgia has also never used abatement. In Taylor v. State,7 1 decided in
1911, the court noted that "the plaintiff in error has departed this life, prior
to the decision of the case."' 72 It went on to say, "It is ordered that the writ
of error be and the same is hereby dismissed. '73 A later case justified
dismissal of the appeal on the grounds that "[any further action against the
'74
defendant could not proceed even if the case be reversed on appeal.
Therefore, not every court considered abatement the natural course of
action, but they all recognized that an appeal could not proceed, and that
simply dismissing the case was proper.
The main early issue regarding the doctrine focused on whether the
obligation to pay criminal fines abated upon death. In United States v.
Pomeroy,75 a 1907 federal case, the circuit court noted that there was "little
authority" to guide it on this question. It decided the problem on policy
grounds-stating that the point of criminal law is to punish the defendant,
and not his heirs and next of kin. 76 Thus, the court declared that the

63. Id. at 456.
64. 32 N.E. 192 (Ill.
1892) (per curiam).
65. Id. at 193; Tim E. Staggs, Note, Legacy of a Scandal: How John Geoghan's Death
May Serve as an Impetus to Bring Abatement Ab Initio in Line with the Victims' Rights
Movement, 38 Ind. L. Rev. 507, 515 (2005).
66. See O'Sullivan, 32 N.E. at 194.
67. See State v. Raffone, 285 A.2d 323, 325-26 (Conn. 1971).
68. Id. at 326.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., State v. Trantolo, 549 A.2d 1074, 1074 (Conn. 1988) (per curiam); State v.
Grasso, 374 A.2d 239, 241 (Conn. 1977) (citing Raffone as authority for dismissing the

appeal as moot). In Trantolo, one justice argued for the adoption of the abatement doctrine,
complaining that Grasso and Raffone had been mistakenly adopted as legal authority on the
question. See Trantolo, 549 A.2d at 1074-75 (Healey, J., dissenting).

71. 72 S.E. 898 (Ga. 1911) (per curiam).
72. Id. at 898.
73. Id.
74. State v. Dodelin, 319 S.E.2d 911, 911 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
75. 152 F. 279, 280 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), rev'd sub. nom., United States v. N.Y. Cent.
& H.R.R. Co., 164 F. 324 (2d Cir. 1908).
76. Id. at 282.
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defendant's fine had abated along with the judgment, and the estate was not
77
liable for it.
State courts generally agreed with the result in Pomeroy.78 According to
the court in Boyd v. State,79 "The personal representative of the deceased is
not responsible for the alleged violation of the law," and thus he or she
cannot be required to pay on the decedent's behalf.80 A concurring Illinois
court opinion reasoned that, unlike in a civil suit where the plaintiff has a
property right 1in the judgment, there is no property right to uphold in a
8
criminal fine.
2. Criminal Law Rationales in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries
Before the mid-nineteenth century in England (as well as in early
American colonial times), victims were required to apprehend and
prosecute criminals who had wronged them if they wanted the criminals to
be punished. 82 Victims would have to initiate proceedings, called "appeals"
or "indictments," before a judge provided by the king.8 3 The victim could
84
extract compensation from the criminal as well as punishment.
85
Unfortunately, the victim had to bear all the costs of prosecution. Due to
this limitation, justice was not consistently enforced--especially in less86
affluent communities.
This system of private prosecutions came to be considered "elitist,
inefficient,

. .

.vindictive[,]" and "partisan.

'87

As the American colonies

77. Id. at 283; accord United States v. Dunne, 173 F. 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1909). The
Second Circuit reversed the Pomeroy court's decision on the grounds that the motion by the
estate was a "civil suit ...[by the] estate to relieve it from the payment of the judgment."
N.Y Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 164 F. at 325. It reasoned that the matter of the estate's liability
was separate from the matter of "guilt or innocence," and thus the court, as essentially
presiding over a civil matter, did not have authority to abate the judgment. Id.
78. See Blackwell v. State, 113 N.E. 723, 723 (Ind. 1916) ("The weight of authority
seems to be to the effect that a fine imposed as a punishment for an offense cannot be
enforced after the death of the defendant as a claim against his estate."); see also Boyd v.
State, 108 P. 431, 431 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910); People v. Alexander, 281 P. 697, 697 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1929).
79. 108 P. 431.
80. Id. at 431.
81. O'Sullivan v. People, 32 N.E. 192, 192-93 (Ill. 1892).
82. Jennie L. Cassie, Note, Passingthe Victims' Rights Amendment: A Nation 's March
Toward a More Perfect Union, 24 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 647, 649-50
(1998). This system was called the "private prosecutorial system." Id. at 650.
83. Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the ProsecutorialProcess, 9 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 357, 360 (1986). Alternatively, if the victim felt feisty, he could choose to fight the
criminal in "battle" and whoever won would be considered the winner of the trial. Id.
Needless to say, this option was rarely used, but it was legal in England until 1819. Id. at 360
n.14.
84. Cassie, supra note 82, at 649.
85. Id. at 650.
86. Id. at 651-52.
87. Cardenas, supra note 83, at 369.
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expanded, it became harder for victims to rely on neighbors to help catch
criminals, and prosecutions, therefore, became more difficult. 88 Crime
victims eventually became frustrated with their decreasing ability to deal
89
with crime.
The new system, which used professional public prosecutors, would
bring "uniformity" to the method of prosecuting crimes and relieve victims
of the duty to prosecute their own cases. 90 One significant by-product of
this systemic change was that the private needs and interests of crime
victims were relegated to a lower rung on the priority ladder. 9 1 The only
interests involved in this early conception of criminal law were those of the
92
state and the accused.
This change in philosophy was largely the product of the Enlightenment
Era, which promulgated the idea that crimes and criminals were "an overall
societal concern" rather than a private dispute between a victim and a
perpetrator. 93 The Enlightenment thinker Cesare Beccaria was highly
influential in this time period, producing one of the most important criminal
law texts of that era, Of Crimes and Punishments.94 He argued that
individuals formed governments by giving up a little of their natural liberty
so they could "enjoy the rest in peace and safety. '95 The state, as
"administrator," had the authority to punish violations of the criminal law
"to prevent the despotic spirit, which is in every man, from
plunging the laws of society into its original chaos."' 96 This philosophy was
based on the view that some individuals in society were always seeking to
encroach on the liberty of others. 97 Conceptions about government such as
Beccaria's led adherents to conclude that it was the state's natural province,
98
as protector of individuals' liberty, to handle criminal violations.
The Enlightenment also produced the notion of due process protections
99
for criminal defendants, which was enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.
00
Conversely, crime victims had no constitutional rights.1 The commitment
to the rights of the accused caused the appeals process to grow in
88. Id. at 368.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 371. Government officials, concerned about the lack of collection of public
fines and the potential of victims to abuse their ability to extract compensation, favored the
change. Id. at 369.
91. Id. at 372. The civil proceeding was seen as the vehicle whereby a victim could seek
restitution of private wrongs related to the crime. Id.
92. See id. at 371.
93. Cassie, supra note 82, at 652.
94. See Cardenas, supra note 83, at 369 n.59.
95. Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, 11 (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963).
Other thinkers concurred with Beccaria. See, e.g., Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social
Contract and Discourses 18-19 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950).
96. Beccaria, supra note 95, at 12.
97. Id.
98. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Cardenas, supra note 83, at 369; Cassie, supra note 82, at
652.
99. Cassie, supra note 82, at 653-54.
100. Id. at 655.
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importance over time,10 1 although there has never been a constitutional
right to appeal a criminal conviction. 102 The ability to review a conviction
is essential to protecting due process and ensuring that "the innocent will
not be punished."' 0 3 Since the time that the Supreme Court declared that
there was no right to an appeal, new rights and rules were added to the
criminal justice system, making trials "more complex" than they were in the
nineteenth century. 10 4 The more considerations that entered the criminal
justice system, the greater the chance of error, and, in turn, the greater the
need for appellate review. 10 5 Thus, "[p]ost-trial review has become an
integral part of the adjudicatory mechanism of every American
jurisdiction."' 1 6 Without such review, it would be extremely difficult to
guarantee all the rights10 that
criminal defendants enjoy and ensure complex
7
procedure is followed.
It was in this environment that the common law abatement doctrine
developed. The justification for using the abatement doctrine, or for not
using it, was tied with the goals of criminal law that prevailed. Before the
late twentieth century, the major rationale for criminal law was to punish
the defendant. 0 8 The interests of victims were marginalized. 0 9 Combine
that with the high importance put on due process and the increased use of
the appeals process to safeguard those rights, "10 and the abatement doctrine,
as formed, seems very logical. If the defendant is not alive to be punished,
and his or her conviction has not been deemed final through review, there is
no point to retaining the conviction.
101. See Joseph Sauder, How a Criminal Defendant's Death Pending Direct Appeal
Affects the Victim 's Right to Restitution Under the Abatement Ab Initio Doctrine, 71 Temp.
L. Rev. 347, 359-60 (1998).
102. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894); Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the
Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 503, 505 (1992). The
development of the appeals process in the federal system occurred gradually. Congress gave
circuit courts authority to issue writs of error in 1879. See Arkin, supra, at 522-23. In 1889,
Congress gave the Supreme Court the right to review capital convictions. See Arkin, supra,
at 523. Then the Court was granted direct review over all "'capital or otherwise infamous
crimes' in 1891. Arkin, supra, at 523 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat.
826-27). It was only in 1897 that Congress granted jurisdiction over noncapital appeals to
the circuit courts of appeal. See Arkin, supra, at 523-24. The appeals system as we
understand it today, with direct review the sole responsibility of the circuit courts, was not
instituted until 1911. See Arkin, supra, at 524.
103. Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 971.
104. Arkin, supra note 102, at 574-75. For example, the exclusionary rule was first
established in 1914, and the "right of counsel" line of cases did not begin until 1932. Id. at
574 & n.286, 575.
105. Id. at 575.
106. Id. at 576.
107. See id. For example, the capital sentencing process is "complex" and potential for
error is high. Id. at 576 n.294.
108. State v. Korsen, Ill P.3d 130, 134 (Idaho 2005); cf William F. McDonald, The Role
of the Victim in America, in Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution and the Legal
Process 295, 295-97 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977) (describing the
defendant-centric view of criminal law that prevailed before the victims' fights movement).
109. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
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3. 1971-1976: The Supreme Court Temporarily Endorses Abatement
In 1971, an important U.S. Supreme Court case, Durham v. United
States,"' l gave a boost to abatement doctrine advocates. 1 2 George
Washington Durham was convicted in Oregon District Court of "having
knowingly possessed a counterfeit $20 bill.""13 After an ultimately
writ of
unsuccessful appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Durham petitioned for a 114
certiorari, but died before the Court could decide whether to grant it.
The Court noted that the "unanimity of the lower federal courts [with
regards to abatement]... is impressive," and responded by adopting the
rule for itself1 15 It referred to Crooker v. United States, 1 6 in which the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the varying language
employed by the different circuits.117 Crooker observed that "there appears
to be no difference in the nature or scope of the abatement which [the
federal circuits] have thus recognized.""1 8
In dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote that "the situation is not one
where the decedent possessed.., a right of appeal to this Court" and
concluded Crooker was distinguishable on this ground. 119 Blackmun would
get his way five years later. In Dove v. United States, 20 the Court issued a
short summary opinion overruling Durham and dismissing the petition for
certiorari, over the opinionless objection of Justice Byron White. 12 1
Because of the lack of guidance in Dove, "the legal community [was] left to
22
divine what it [could] of the Supreme Court's stand on abatement.'
The Seventh Circuit was the first court to attempt to make sense of the
decision. 123 In United States v. Moehlenkamp, 124 the court held that the
Supreme Court was simply deciding what its own policy would be and did

111. 401 U.S. 481 (1971) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Dove v. United
States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976) (per curiam).
112. See Staggs, supra note 65, at 512.
113. Durham, 401 U.S. at 481.
114. Id.

115. Id. at 483.
116. 325 F.2d 318, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1963).
117. Durham, 401 U.S. at 482-83.
118. Crooker,325 F.2d at 319.
119. Durham, 401 U.S. at 484 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. 423 U.S. 325, 325 (1976) (per curiam).
121. Dove has been noted by various commentators for its vagueness and lack of
substance. See, e.g., United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977)
(referring to the Dove "Court's cryptic statement"); Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 952
(referring to it as "an opaque one paragraph per curiam opinion"); Brian Kleinhaus, Note,
Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA
through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth

Amendment, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2711, 2735 (2005) (characterizing Dove as "a concise
opinion").
122. Staggs, supra note 65, at 512.
123. Lynn Johnston Splitek, Note, State v. McDonald: Death of a Criminal Defendant
PendingAppeal in Wisconsin-the Appeal Survives, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 811, 814.

124. 557 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1977).
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not want to instruct the lower courts on what they should do. 12 5 It reasoned
that because review before the Supreme Court was not a right, as opposed
to review in the circuit courts of appeal, which was, the circuit courts were
still free to use the abatement doctrine. 126 The other circuits came to adopt
the reasoning of Moehlenkamp, thus retaining almost unanimous use of the
127
doctrine by the federal courts.
4. The Rise of Victims' Rights
While the federal courts continued to use the abatement doctrine, major
changes occurred across the United States in regards to victims' rights.' 28
These changes took hold in the 1970s and 1980s but had their origins in the
1960s. 129 An important impetus for the promotion of victims' rights was
the Civil Rights movement, and its emphasis on protecting individual
rights, as well as the women's rights movement, concerned about the
treatment of victims of rape and domestic violence.' 30 Furthermore, during
the 1970s and 1980s the crime rate increased significantly. 131 The increase
in crime coincided with a heightened public concern about crime during the
same period, fueled by political attention paid to the issue. 32 Over this
period, American attitudes toward crime developed a markedly more
punitive bent. 133 With this shift came the widespread perception that courts
were not harsh enough toward criminals. 134 By 1980, society also realized
that victims were being ignored in the process, and groups sprung up to
provide and advocate for victim services.1 35 President Ronald Reagan was
a sympathizer to the plight of victims, and he commissioned a task force to
125. Id. at 128.

126. Id. (adopting the reasoning of Justice Harry Blackmun in his Durham dissent). The
court believed it was justified in continuing to abate convictions it was reviewing because
such actions protected rights retained by the defendant. See id. By contrast, a defendant
whose case is under review by the Supreme Court has already exercised that right and thus
would not be deprived of it. Id.
127. See Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1036 (Md. 2006) (describing the methods used
by the federal circuits).
128. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 1.4(k) (2d ed. 2000).
129. Id.
130. Don Siegelman & Courtney W. Tarver, Victims' Rights in State Constitutions, 1
Emerging Issues St. Const. L. 163, 165 (1988).
131. Cf Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the U.S.: Long Term Trends
and Patterns, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/hmrt.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007)

(showing that between 1960 and 1970, the homicide rate in the United States increased by
approximately 50% and increased by the same amount by 1980).
132. Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American
Politics 3 (1997).
133. Id. at 3 n.2. For example, one poll showed that American support for the death
penalty grew to 71% in 1988, up from just 45% in 1965. Id.
134. Id. A poll showed that 82% of Americans felt this way in 1988, compared with 48%
in 1965. Id.
135. David L. Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer the
"Forgotten Victim," 17 Pepp. L. Rev. 35, 36 (1989). Examples of such groups include the
National Organization for Victims Assistance, and Mothers Against Drunk Driving. Id. at 36
n.3.
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136
help improve the treatment of victims by the criminal justice system.
rights
This new movement, which began to be known as the "victims'
37

movement," was an amalgamation of various interests in society.1
The broad effect of the victims' rights movement was to establish the
interests of crime victims as a consideration in creating criminal procedural
rules. 138 To achieve this effect, the movement engaged in various tactics.
There was an attempt to modify the U.S. Constitution to protect the rights

of victims. 139 President Reagan's task force recommended in 1982 that the
Sixth Amendment be amended to give victims the right to "'be heard"' at
0
all times during a criminal proceeding.14 But, it was never adopted.141
The proponents of victims' rights had better luck getting statutory
reforms passed. Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act
(VWPA) in 1982.142 This statute empowered federal judges to order

restitution from persons convicted of certain federal crimes to any person
victimized by his or her acts. 143 It also required that the judge include a
136. Id. at 36. He also made the week of April 19, 1984, "National Victims' Rights
Week." Id.
137. See 1 LaFave et al., supra note 128, § 1.4(k). These included prosecutors and police,
who wanted greater cooperation from victims, as well as conservatives who wanted to "shift
the focus in sentencing from rehabilitation and deterrence to retribution and incapacitation
and saw required consideration of the views of the victim as a natural ally in this quest." Id.
Also included were more liberal elements in society, who saw treatment of certain victims
by the criminal justice system to be offensive. Id. Some commentators see the women's
movement as the reason for the rise of victims' rights. See, e.g., Keith D. Nicholson,
Comment, Would You Like More Salt with That Wound? Post-Sentence Victim Allocution in
Texas, 26 St. Mary's L.J. 1103, 1111 (1995). Humanitarians saw crime victims as similar to
victims of natural disasters and thus felt they deserved the same social assistance. See 1
LaFave et al., supra note 128, § 1.4(k).
138. Cardenas, supra note 83, at 358.
139. Roland, supra note 135, at 37.
140. Id. (quoting President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, Final Report 114 (1982)).
141. Id. Support for the amendment has continued, with President William Jefferson
Clinton calling for its adoption in 1996 (along with his Republican opponent Senator Bob
Dole) for the purpose of "guarantee[ing] that victims' rights are weighted equally with
defendants' rights." John M. Broder, Clinton Callsfor Victims' Rights in Constitution, L.A.
Times, June 26, 1996, at Al (quoting President Clinton). President George W. Bush
endorsed a similar proposal, submitted to the Senate by Senators Dianne Feinstein, Democrat
of California, and John Kyl Republican of Arizona, in 2002. Joe Salkowski, Bush Backs
Victims' Rights Amendment to Constitution, Ariz. Daily Star, Apr. 17, 2002, at Al. It had
been submitted several times since 1996, to no avail. Id. Concerns about the propriety of
amending the Constitution for this purpose (as opposed to passing a simple statute) have
frustrated the amendment's passage. See id. Other opponents, including legislative counsel
of the ACLU, see existing protections as adequate. Id. Also, concerns about the possible
infringement on states' rights and the lack of definition of who is a victim have driven
opponents of the amendment. See, e.g., Editorial, Victims' Rights Amendment Is Unwise and
Unnecessary, Tampa Trib., Apr. 19, 2002, at 16.
142. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat.
1248 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2000)), amended by Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.); Heidi M.
Grogan, CharacterizingCriminal Restitution Pursuantto the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act: Focus on the Third Circuit, 78 Temp. L. Rev. 1079, 1079 (2005).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (1982) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2000)).
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"victim impact statement" in the presentence report. 144 The statute takes
steps to protect potential witnesses and victims by criminalizing the
threatening and intimidating of another with the intent to coerce the victim
145
into withholding cooperation from the authorities.
This act was a response to what Congress found to be mistreatment of
victims-including being "ignored by the criminal justice system or simply
used to identify offenders."' 146 The Senate Report pointed out that criminal
defendants have a right to counsel to help explain the process and the

accused's rights, but crime victims have no such rights. 147 Congress also
recognized the risks borne by victims who cooperate with authorities,
including harassment by the defendant or his associates while out on bail. 148
The VWPA is significant in that it is the first time Congress has provided

for restitution for victims of federal crimes. 14 9 Apart from providing for
compensation to a victim for his or her loss, restitution is intended to tell
victims that they are not forgotten, and also to tell the criminal that his or
her actions have harmed someone and that the criminal is responsible for
50
making amends.
Thirteen years later Congress decided that the VWPA needed some
improvements. 15 1 Restitution was ordered in only about one-fifth of all
eligible federal cases under the VWPA regime. 152 Congress thought that
this was not a consistent enough application of the statute, so it put a
provision in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 153 to amend
the VWPA. This provision is known as the Mandatory Victim Restitution

144. Id. app. (modifying Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2) (current version at Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(d)(2))). A victim impact statement is a written "statement of the circumstances of the
commission of the offense and circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior . . . [;]
information concerning any harm, including financial, social, psychological, and physical
harm, done to or loss suffered by any victim of the offense; and... any other information
that may aid the court in sentencing, including the restitution needs of any victim of the
offense." Id.
145. Id. § 1512 (original version at Pub. L. No. 97-271 § 4(a) (1982)).
146. S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 10 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2516.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Grogan, supra note 142, at 1079. There is a disconnect between the traditional
contractual concept of restitution and criminal restitution as discussed here. Id. at 1104. In
contract law, restitution is an equitable doctrine which is intended to prevent the breaching
party from being unjustly enriched by his action. Id. Restitution under the VWPA has other
purposes which are in dispute among the federal circuits. See id. at 1082-87.
150. Id. at 1102.
151. See S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 13 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 926.
The amendment seems to be dwarfed in importance by the antiterrorism and death penalty
provisions of the bill-the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act was not even mentioned by
President Clinton in his signing remarks. See Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 1 Pub. Papers 630 (Apr. 24, 1996), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=52713.
152. S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 926. According to the Sentencing Commission, restitution
was ordered in 27.9% of murders, 55.2% of robberies, and 28.2% of all kidnappings. Id.
153. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
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Act of 1996 (MVRA). 154 The MVRA removes the discretion granted by
the VWPA to judges to order restitution, and requires them to order
restitution when there is an "identifiable victim." 155 It also removes
consideration of whether a defendant is able to pay restitution-it provides
156
for restitution to be paid on an installment plan in case of indigence.
There were also changes in regards to victims' rights on the state level.
The movement to amend the Federal Constitution had failed, so victims'
advocates began to organize to push for state-level constitutional
amendments. 157 In 1986, a group was formed to push for these state-level
amendments-the "Victims Constitutional Amendment Network" (Victims
CAN). 158 This organization was composed of members of various victim
advocacy groups. 159
They preferred that states pass constitutional
amendments in lieu of statutory provisions. 160 The primary reason was that
many so-called "victims' bill of rights" statutes were toothless-they did
not provide for a mechanism for redress if the right was denied. 16 1 Also,
victims' rights advocates saw constitutional amendments as a statement that
the state viewed the rights of the victims as equal to the rights of the
62
defendant in a criminal proceeding. 1
California became the first state to pass a victims' rights amendment in
1982.163 The voter-approved provision provided a victim the right to
"restitution, safe schools, consideration of public safety when setting bail,
and unrestricted admissibility of prior felony convictions ... [as well as]
the absolute right to appear at sentencing and parole proceedings.' 64 With
the help of Victims CAN, Florida and Michigan jumped on the bandwagon
with voter-approved amendments in 1988.165 By 1990, Washington and

154. Id. §§ 201-211, 110 Stat. at 1227-41 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.

(2000)).
155. S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 926.
156. Grogan, supra note 142, at 1079-80. The VWPA allowed judges to "consider the

amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources
of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's
dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate," in deciding whether or
not to award restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3580 (1982) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3664
(2000)).
157. See Alice Koskela, Comment, Victim's Rights Amendments: An IrresistiblePolitical
Force Transforms the CriminalJustice System, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 157, 165 (1997).

158. Id. at 164-65.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 165.
161. Siegelman & Tarver, supra note 130, at 168. Thus, these "bills of rights" are really

"bills of wishes." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
162.
163.
164.
165.

See Koskela, supra note 157, at 165.
Id.
Roland, supra note 135, at 38-39 (discussing Cal. Const. art. I, § 28).
Koskela, supra note 157, at 165. However, Arizona and Washington's attempts to

pass such amendments failed that same year. Id.
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Texas had passed similar amendments. 166 By 1996, twenty-three more
167
states had such amendments.
5. The Modem State of Abatement
The increased focus on victims' rights altered the calculus of criminal
law from the simple interest of the state versus the interest of the defendant
by adding the interest of the victim. This new conception caused courts to
reconsider their previous use of the abatement doctrine. 168 In the mid1990s several states abandoned their previous use of abatement. 169 This
trend continued in the mid-2000s, with four states 170 and the U.S.
military171 abandoning the doctrine.
Today, the problem of what to do when a convicted defendant dies before
being able to appeal is solved by using five separate approaches, all of
which are followed by at least one court. 172 Most courts (including nearly
all federal circuits) follow abatement ab initio (option 1).173 "About twelve
state courts" expressly refuse to abate the conviction and let the conviction
stand (option 2). 174 Some of the courts (including the Third and Fourth
Circuits1 75), which use abatement, abate everything except restitution orders

(option 3).176 Around seven states permit a substitute party to continue the
appeal (option 4).177 Finally, only Alabama makes a notation in the record
1
that the appeal was made, but could not be heard (option 5). 78

166. Id.
167. Id. For a good discussion of the specific legislative changes made to promote
victims' interests, see generally Roland, supra note 135 (discussing victim restitution, victim
compensation for crime-related costs, anti-intimidation laws, and victim participation laws).
168. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. A few states changed their stances earlier
than the 1990s. See State v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, 1003 (N.M. 1997) (citing State v. Jones,
551 P.2d 801 (Kan. 1976), and State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio 1987)).
169. These states included the following: Michigan in People v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160
(Mich. 1995), Hawaii in State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967 (Haw. 1995), Florida in State v.
Clements, 668 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1996), and New Mexico in Salazar, 945 P.2d 996. These
cases are discussed in United States v. Rorie, 58 M.J. 399, 402 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
170. These states included the following: Alabama in Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461
(Ala. 2005), Idaho in State v. Korsen, Ill P.3d 130 (Idaho 2005), Maryland in Surland v.
State, 895 A.2d 1034 (Md. 2006), and Washington in State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599 (Wash.
2006). For a discussion of these cases, see Opposition to the Motion to Vacate, supra note
15, at 4.
171. The abatement doctrine was rejected in Rorie, 58 M.J. at 407. Id.
172. See Surland, 895 A.2d at 1035.
173. Id. at 1035-36.
174. Id. at 1036.
175. See United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1984). The Third Circuit
also does not abate restitution orders, but instead allows a personal representative to pursue
an appeal. United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 295 (3d Cir. 2001).
176. Surland, 895 A.2d at 1035-36.
177. Id.
178. Id.; Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461, 464 (Ala. 2005).
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C. InterestsAffected by the Abatement Doctrine

When state and federal courts consider whether to apply abatement or an
alternative doctrine, they consider a myriad of competing interests.
1. Interests of the Defendant
One interest courts consider is the defendant's interest in appellate review
of his or her conviction. 179 This is heavily guarded in our criminal justice
system.' 8 0 It is held in such high regard that courts that use abatement
presume the success of such appeal.' 8' There is a stigma associated with
being mistakenly declared guilty of a crime-which of course the defendant
82
wants to avoid.1
2. Interests of the Defendant's Family and Estate
Another interest accounted for is the interest of the defendant's heirs and
next of kin in avoiding punishment they do not deserve. 183 In the U.S. legal
system punishment of the innocent is strictly forbidden. 184 This is one
reason why courts are reluctant to collect unpaid fines from the defendant's

estate.185
Also, the family has an interest in having their loved one's name cleared
if he is truly innocent. 186 This interest exists not just for the sake of the
defendant's reputation-families also have an interest in avoiding any
1 87
liability associated with that conviction.
3. Victims' Interests
Victims have interests which have only recently been seriously
recognized.' 8 8 They have an interest in receiving compensation for loss due
to criminal activity perpetrated against them.' 8 9 It is hardly unfair to
179. Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 945.
180. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
182. See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2004).
183. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
184. See 1 LaFave et al., supra note 128, § 1.4(e). For example, the U.S. Constitution
forbids so-called "bills of attainder." U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10 (denying this power to
Congress and the states, respectively). Bills of attainder were punishments of death pursuant
to an act of parliament against a person or group of people, rather than pursuant to the
finding of a jury. 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 673 (2006). In our system,
punishments for acts that were not illegal when they were committed are considered
unjust-thus the legislature was forbidden from meting out such punishment. See Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388-89 (1798).
185. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
186. Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 957 (citing State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65, 67 (La.
1976)).
187. Splitek, supra note 123, at 829-30. This concern may force families to fund and
pursue an appeal, if possible in that state, they may not otherwise have pursued. Id.
188. See supra Part L.B.4.
189. See supra notes 143, 149-51 and accompanying text.
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require a criminal to compensate another for a loss he or she caused by
committing a crime.
Victims also have an interest in obtaining retribution against the person
who wronged them. This can be expressed as a need for "closure" or a need
to see "justice done."' 190 Recently, the federal government and the states
have provided victims themselves some of the tools necessary to facilitate
the fulfillment of this interest. 19 1
4. Interests of Society
Society itself has several interests at play. Often they are the same
interests claimed by others in this context. For instance, society has an
interest in providing a justice system that facilitates error correction (a
macro version of the defendant's interest in appeal). 192 A free and just
society cannot exist if the state is routinely declaring innocent people to be
93
guilty. 1
Society also shares the victim's interest in retribution. 194 It favors
retribution not so much to obtain "closure" but to provide a deterrent
effect. 19 5 In the abatement context, specific deterrence is impossible (the
96
criminal is dead), but general deterrence is still feasible. 1
5. Interests of the Court System
The court system is interested in having justice administered as quickly
and cheaply as possible. Additionally, courts have an interest in recouping
the costs of criminal proceedings. 197 To this end, some states require
defendants to pay the costs of criminal proceedings against them.'1 98
Courts also have an interest in only deciding actual cases or
controversies. In other words, they do not want to waste their time holding
proceedings and making decisions that have little to no practical effect. 199
In the federal system, the Constitution requires an actual case or
controversy in order for a federal court to obtain subject matter
200
jurisdiction.

190. Staggs, supra note 65, at 528; see also infra notes 277-86 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Part LB.4.
192. State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1987).
193. See Staggs, supra note 65, at 515-16.
194. See id.at 527.
195. Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Miss. 1994).
196. See id. The very fact of capture and conviction of the dead criminal would have the
deterrent effect on other potential criminals. The death of the defendant before appeal would
be irrelevant since the effect would be had upon conviction.
197. See State v. Korsen, Ill P.3d 130, 134 (Idaho 2005).
198. See, e.g., id; infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
200. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
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II. ANALYSIS OF ABATEMENT AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
This part provides an analysis of each major option, articulating the
advantages and disadvantages of each.
A. Option 1: Abate the ProceedingsAb Initio
Why did courts invent this doctrine in the first place? First, as discussed
earlier, this doctrine is logical considering the environment in which it was
created. 20 1 The Pomeroy court held that the "fundamental principle ... is
that the object of criminal punishment is to punish the criminal. ' 20 2 If a
defendant has died, it is impossible to punish the defendant, so the
conviction must abate. 20 3 Some courts use formalistic logic-reasoning
that when the defendant died, the court lost jurisdiction to enforce the
20 4
judgment against him.
Second, continuing on the theme of futility, courts that use abatement
also do so because hearing an appeal is pointless. 20 5 If the defendant has
died, then there is no reason to waste the time hearing an appeal-if the
appeal results in a need for a new trial, for example, the trial could not be
had without a defendant. 20 6 If the appeal upheld the conviction, then the
judgment could not be enforced anyway-resulting in essentially a waste of
207
the court's time.
A third rationale, related to the idea that criminal law is meant to punish
the defendant, is that criminal law does not work to punish the defendant's
family, heirs, or next of kin. 20 8 In fact the U.S. Constitution supports this
concept because it does not allow punishment for treason to "work
corruption of blood. '20 9 This expresses an attitude that only one who
commits a crime should be punished, and not someone related to him or
her.
A final and more modem rationale for keeping abatement relates to the
"right" to appeal. There is no federal constitutional right to a criminal
appeal. 2 10 However, forty-seven of fifty states grant at least one appeal of
right, with the others providing a procedure that is essentially an appeal of

201.
202.
203.
204.

See supra Part I.B.2.
United States v. Pomeroy, 152 F. 279, 282 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907).
State v. Griffin, 592 P.2d 372, 373 (Ariz. 1979); Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 956.
See, e.g., State v. Kreichbaum, 258 N.W. 110, 113 (Iowa 1934), cited in Griffin, 592

P.2d at 373; see also Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 956 n.40 (citing other cases with
jurisdictional rationales for abatement).
205. State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65, 67 (La. 1976); Staggs, supra note 65, at 509.
206. Morris, 328 So. 2d at 67.

207. Id.
208. United States v. Pomeroy, 152 F. 279, 282 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907); see also David
Pureza, Recent Decisions: Mississippi Allows Any Party to File Motion for Substitution
Upon Death of Criminal Defendant and Adopts Abatement Ab Initio as Default Rule, 64
Miss. L.J. 819, 833 (1995).
209. U.S. Const. art. III, § 3; see also O'Sullivan v. People, 32 N.E. 192, 193 (Ill. 1892).
210. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985); Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 965.
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right, but is ostensibly discretionary. 2 11 The constitutions of fifteen states
enshrine the right to appeal. 2 12 Commentators have said that the right to
and so respected that it should be considered a
appeal is so important
2 13
fundamental right.
Because review of a conviction is held in high regard in our legal system,
many courts that use abatement hold that depriving a defendant of review of
his conviction would be unfair. 2 14 The criminal justice system relies on
appellate review to make society confident that a criminal conviction is
valid and correct. 2 15 If this appeals process is necessary to validate a
who has died pending a
conviction, then we cannot say that a defendant
2 16
review of right has truly been convicted.
The major disadvantage of abatement is that it completely ignores the
interest of the victim, which, as this Note has pointed out, has only recently
become important in criminal law.2 17 It deprives the victim of any interest
in restitution. 2 18 It also stymies any collateral civil proceedings against the
defendant's estate, by depriving the plaintiff of the benefit of offensive
collateral estoppel. 2 19 Other disadvantages of abatement are discussed
below in Part II.B as advantages of the non-abatement option.
B. Option 2: Dismiss the Appeal as Moot but Preserve the Conviction
(Non-abatement)
As much as the rise of the abatement doctrine was a function of the
environment in which it was created, so was the rejection of the abatement
doctrine and its replacement with the doctrine of what this Note refers to as
"non-abatement." Courts that use non-abatement simply dismiss the appeal
of the dead defendant as moot but do not overturn the conviction. 220 The
environment in which non-abatement arose was one shaped by the victims'
rights movement, which advocated for greater attention to victims in the
criminal justice system. 22 1 Thus, the major advantage to non-abatement is
that it takes victims' rights into account.
State v. Devin,222 a very recent Washington case, adopted non-abatement
in dicta after ninety years of using the abatement doctrine. 223 The
211. Arkin, supra note 102, at 513-14.
212. Id. at 516.
213. See generally id.; Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 982-84.

214. Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 954; see, e.g., Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1300
(Miss. 1994) ("[I]t is equally unjust to allow a conviction to stand ... as if the appeal had
been heard and the conviction affirmed.").
215. Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 956-57.
216. See Staggs, supra note 65, at 516-17 (referring to the appeals process as necessary to
render a defendant "confirmed in guilt").
217. See supra Part I.B.4.
218. See Opposition to the Motion to Vacate, supra note 15, at 2.
219. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
220. Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1035 (Md. 2006); Splitek, supra note 123, at 817.
221. See supra Part I.B.4.

222. 142 P.3d 599 (Wash. 2006).
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defendant, Jules Devin, was convicted of attempting to murder his son's exwife while the couple was in a bitter custody dispute over their three-yearold daughter. 224 He was ordered to "pay a $500 victim penalty assessment
to King County. ' 225 Restitution was ultimately not set because of the
reluctance of the victim and because of the inability of the state to ascertain
her medical costs. 226 Devin died shortly after appealing to the Washington
Court of Appeals, which then abated his conviction. 227 The state then
petitioned 8the Washington Supreme Court to overturn the abatement
22
doctrine.
The court questioned whether abatement should continue as the law in
Washington in part because of the impact of the doctrine on victims'
rights. 229 The court noted that since the original adoption of abatement, the
voters amended the state constitution to grant victims the right to a
"meaningful role in the criminal justice system" and "due dignity and
respect." 230 Also, Washington crime victims have the right to restitution. 23 1
In light of these considerations, the court rejected as outdated the earlier
rationale for abatement, articulated in State v. Furth,232 that the point of
233
criminal justice is purely punishment.
A second rationale for non-abatement was articulated in an Idaho case,
State v. Korsen.234 David Korsen was convicted of kidnapping after he hid
235
his two children from their mother, in violation of a custody order.
Pursuant to Idaho law, he was ordered to pay $13,773 in costs and fees and
$13,685 in restitution. 236 After his case was submitted to the Idaho
Supreme Court for review, Korsen "apparently" committed suicide. 237
The court acknowledged that after a conviction, the presumption of
innocence is extinguished. 238 Abatement essentially assumes that an appeal
would have succeeded, since abatement has the same effect as a successful
appeal. 239 If there is no presumption of innocence after a conviction,
however, it is inconsistent to presume an appeal would have succeeded. 240

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 601, 603-04.
Id. at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id. at 604.
Id. (citing Wash. Const. art. I, § 35).
Id. (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 7.69.030 (2006)).
144 P. 907 (Wash. 1914).
See Devin, 142 P.3d at 604.

234. 111 P.3d 130 (Idaho 2005).

235. Id. at 130-31.
236. Id. at 131.
237. Id.

238. Id. at 134. The U.S. Supreme Court is in accord with this proposition. See Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993).
239. Korsen, 111 P.3dat 134.

240. Id.; Staggs, supra note 65, at 518.
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Third, non-abatement preserves the interests of society in recouping the
costs of criminal prosecutions. The Korsen court also acknowledged that
the Idaho legislature had changed the nature of criminal law to "require
convicted criminal defendants to shoulder the costs of criminal
proceedings."' 24 1 Idaho also has several provisions requiring fines to
compensate victims of the criminals' activity and contribute to a state
victims' compensation fund. 242 Finally, state law requires an order of
restitution when the crime causes economic loss, except when it determines
such order unjust. 243 The court concluded that the public policy underlying
these provisions would be short-circuited by the application of the
244
abatement doctrine and therefore it abandoned the use of the doctrine.
Many of the disadvantages of non-abatement are in fact rationales for
using the abatement doctrine. For example, non-abatement deprives the
defendant of the right to review his or her conviction. 245 It also burdens his
or her estate with restitution or fines, punishing the defendant's heirs and
246
next of kin.
C. Option 3: Abate the Punitive Measures Only, While Retainingthe
Compensatory Measures (Dudley Compromise)
The Fourth Circuit is one of the federal circuits that departs significantly
from total application of the traditional abatement doctrine. 247 In United
States v. Dudley,248 it adopted a compromise position in the abatement
debate. William Dudley was convicted of misuse of food stamps, among
other offenses. 249 Pursuant to the VWPA 250 Dudley had been ordered to
pay restitution of $4,807.50 to the U.S. government as well as a fine of
$10,000 for a separate offense. 25 1 Before the Fourth Circuit could
determine the appeal of his case, Dudley died. 2 52 Arguing that restitution is
a "criminal penalt[y]," Dudley's counsel argued that such order should be
253
abated along with fines and imprisonment.

241. Korsen, 111 P.3d at 134; see, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 19-854 (2004) (requiring
criminal defendants to reimburse the state for public defender services).
242. Korsen, 111 P.3d at 134 (citing Idaho Code Ann. §§ 19-5307, 72-1025).

243. Id. at 134-35 (citing Idaho Code Ann. § 19-5304).
244. Id. at 135.
245. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
247. See Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1036 (Md. 2006). The Third Circuit also
departs in that abatement may only be invoked after an appeal has been filed, and not before.
Compare United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2001), with United States
v. Dwyer, 855 F.2d 144, 145 (3d Cir. 1988). It also allows preservation of restitution orders,
but gives a substitute party an opportunity to challenge the order in a further appeal. See
Christopher,273 F.3d at 295.
248. 739 F.2d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 1984).
249. Id. at 175.
250. See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
251. Dudley, 739 F.2d at 176.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit followed a middle course by holding that the
restitution order should not be abated, while the term of imprisonment and
fine would be. 254 In doing so it drew on a principle articulated in the
earliest abatement cases-when a rule's purpose is frustrated, it cannot
apply.2 55 Since fines cannot fulfill their purpose to punish a defendant
when the defendant is dead, the fines abated. 256 The conclusion that
restitution should not be abated followed from the logic of the earlier cases
because, according to the Fourth Circuit, restitution is meant to compensate
the victim 257
(which still could be done)-in this case, the U.S.
government.

The court essentially found Mr. Dudley had stolen $4,807.50 worth of
258
food stamps from the United States through his illegal use thereof.
Subsequently, the court determined that nothing in the VWPA "foreclosed
[the government] from establishing it had been victimized by the crime and
recovering restitution." 259 The Fourth Circuit, by distinguishing between
pure punishment and compensation, found a way to temper the harsh effects
of abatement without stepping on precedent.
A disadvantage of this approach is that it rests on the controversial
principle that restitution is compensatory. 260 Some courts that use strictly
applied abatement, and have encountered this question, reason that
restitution is primarily penal. 26 1 One such court is the Eleventh Circuit,
which abated the $21 million restitution order of a corporate officer after he
committed

suicide. 262

He

had

been

convicted

of

fraudulently

misrepresenting the financial condition of his company to the SEC.
263
In coming to its decision, the court cited to United States v. Johnson,
where a woman was convicted of passing forged checks to a bank. 264 The
defendant in Johnson pled guilty and received a one-year and one-day
sentence. 265 The sentence would remain suspended as long as she paid
restitution to the bank and fulfilled the other conditions of probation for five
254. See id. at 179. The Third Circuit concurs with this rule. See Kleinhaus, supra note
121, at 2746.
255. Dudley, 739 F.2d at 177.

256. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
257. Dudley, 739 F.2d at 177; Kleinhaus, supra note 121, at 2745-46.
258. Dudley, 739 F.2d at 175-76.

259. Id. at 178.
260. For a detailed discussion of the controversy in the federal courts, see Kleinhaus,
supra note 121, at 2744-49.
261. The U.S. Supreme Court has not weighed in on the issue of whether, for purposes of
the VWPA and the MVRA, restitution is penal or compensatory. Kleinhaus, supra note 121,
at 2712. Generally, the Court will interpret whether restitution, in the statute which
authorizes it, is intended to be compensatory or penal. Id. at 2732 (citing Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). For a discussion of MVRA- and VWPA-

specific case law in regards to the character of restitution, see Grogan, supra note 142, at
1083-90.
262. United States v. Logal, 106 F.3d 1547, 1550, 1552 (11 th Cir. 1997).
263. 983 F.2d 216, 217 (11 th Cir. 1993).
264. Id.
265. Id.
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years. 266 After the defendant failed to make restitution as required, the
court imposed the jail sentence and rescinded the obligations of probation,
which included the obligation to pay restitution. 26 7 The bank moved to
intervene pursuant to the VWPA, to challenge the authority of the district
court to rescind the restitution order. 268 The court denied the bank's motion
to intervene, reasoning (among other things) that restitution is penal in
nature and the victim has no right under the VWPA to have a criminal
restitution order enforced. 269
Johnson cited a bankruptcy case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.2 70
Referring to the notion that the criminal justice system is "operated... for
the benefit of society as a whole," the Court ruled restitution, under the
Connecticut statute at issue, was meant to be a part of the defendant's
rehabilitation (as opposed to being designed to compensate the victim for
his or her loss).271 The amount of restitution is not based on the victim's
injury but the "penal goals of the State and the situation of the
2 72
defendant."
A third stance is taken by the Fifth Circuit, articulated in United States v.
Estate of Parsons.27 3 The defendant was convicted of arson, mail fraud,
and money laundering, and ordered to pay restitution. 2 74 The court
dismissed the controversy over whether restitution is penal or compensatory
as irrelevant-instead arguing that the "finality principle," which states a
criminal conviction is not "final" until the appeals process has been
exhausted, overrides it. 275 If abatement renders the conviction void because
there was no opportunity to pursue the appeal, then it makes little sense to
preserve any restitution order, no matter what its purpose. 276
Preservation of restitution orders seems like a sensible compromise.
However, it makes the erroneous assumption that restitution is the only
problem with abatement. There is also the issue of societal condemnation
of a criminal's act.
To illustrate this issue, consider the following cases. In 1994, a man
named John Salvi opened fire on two abortion clinics in Massachusetts,
killing two women and wounding five others. 277 Upon conviction, Salvi
committed suicide. 2 78 Because Massachusetts uses abatement, he was

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 220-2 1.
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
Id. at 52.
Id.
367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Kleinhaus, supra note 121, at 2748.
Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 411.
Kleinhaus, supra note 121, at 2748.
See id. at 2748-49.
Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 943.
Id. at 945.
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279
"immutably deemed as guiltless as he had been before the shootings."
The mother of one of the victims commented to a Boston television station
that "it's as if John Salvi is coming from the grave to bring me some
hurt."'280 This mother was not the only one affected. The abatement of the
nearconviction sparked public outrage in Massachusetts and led to the
28 1
adoption of a bill overruling the use of abatement by the legislature.
Massachusetts was also the setting for the case of John Geoghan, a
former priest convicted of sexually molesting children. 282 After he was
murdered in his cell in 2003,283 the court, still clinging to abatement,
The reaction to the
rendered him innocent by operation of law.2 84
abatement was less than enthusiastic. One lawyer representing sexual abuse
victims commented, "'The guilty verdict is a symbol which allowed many
clients to regain some sort of self-esteem, dignity, and freedom from
unnecessary guilt,"' and that the victims "'will be extremely disappointed"'
Another lawyer described the abatement as a
by the abatement. 285
2 86
development which will "'revictimize the victims.'
Neither of these cases involved restitution. But the theme underlying
both of them is that a conviction for a heinous crime is in itself justice, and
the loss of that conviction is a massive injustice, without regard to whether
restitution is abated or not.

D. Option 4: Allow a Substitute Party to Continue the Appeal
(Substitution)
An alternative so-called "moderation" approach, followed by some
courts, allows a substitute party to continue and resolve the appeal. 287 This
is an attempt to balance the conflicting interests at play in the abatement
doctrine. 288 It protects the rights of the victims to any restitution, while at
the same time, insuring that the late defendant retains his right to resolve
289
the appeal.
Hawaii, in adopting this alternative, posited the interests protected by
substitution as follows: "[The defendant's] family seeks 'vindication' of
the deceased. The State has an interest in preserving the presumptively

279. Id.
280. Conviction in Killings at Clinics Is Overturned, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1997, at A14

(internal quotation marks omitted).
281. See Cavallaro, supra note 39, at 945 n.6.
282. See Staggs, supra note 65, at 507-08.
283. Id. at 507.
284. Id. at 508.
285. Yvonne Abraham, Geoghan's Death Voids Conviction, Prosecutors Say, Boston
Globe, Aug. 27, 2003, at B 1 (quoting Mitchell Garabedian).
286. Id. (quoting Robert Sherman).

287. See Staggs, supra note 65, at 529.
288. See id.
289. See id.
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valid judgment of the trial court."'290 Also, the court recognized that it is
equally undesirable to assume the conviction would have been overturned
as it would be to deprive the dead defendant of his statutory right to
appellate review. 2 9 1 It relied heavily on a decision of the Ohio Supreme
293
Court, State v. McGettrick,29 2 which also adopted substitution.
McGettrick involved a criminal court judge convicted of accepting
bribes.2 94 The judge died before appealing, and the state petitioned the
Ohio Supreme Court to overrule the policy of abatement.2 95 The court
recognized the conflicting interests that the Hawaii court articulated, but,
rather than framing substitution as a compromise, it pointed to a public
policy that favored rendering a decision on the merits of an appeal. 296 In
Ohio, the costs of criminal proceedings are imposed by statute on convicted
felons. 297 These costs may be assessed against a decedent's estate,
according to case law. 298 It is for this reason, among others, that third
parties have an interest in seeing the outcome of the appeal on the meritsfor example, the heirs and next of kin who would lose the amount of the
99
costs.

2

The interest in correction of error is another societal interest relied upon
as a justification by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in adopting
substitution.30 0 "Leaving convictions intact without review.., potentially
leaves errors uncorrected which will ultimately work to the detriment of our
justice system. '30 1 Essentially, unreviewed convictions are "hollow,"
according to the court, and lack the full adjudication that society
3 02
requires.
There are also problems with the substitution arrangement. First and
foremost, the defendant is not available to make the decision about whether,
290. State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 972 (Haw. 1995).

Hawaii applies substitution to

appeals of right and when the defendant's representative or the state moves for substitution.
Id. If no such motion is made, the court may either abate the proceedings or make "such
other order as the appellate court deems appropriate." Id.
291. Id.
292. 509 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio 1987).
293. See Makaila, 897 P.2d at 970, 972 (citing McGettrick).
294. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d at 379 n. 1.
295. Id. at 380.
296. Id. at 382.
297. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2949.14, 2949.15 (LexisNexis 2006); Wetzel v. Ohio, 371
U.S. 62, 65 (1962).

298. Wetzel, 371 U.S. at 63-64 (citing State v. Keifer, 1913 WL 988, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct.
Com. P1. 1913) (relieving decedent's estate of liability for unpaid fines, but not costs)). The
court in Keifer reasoned that costs were unrelated to the punishment meted out to the
defendant, but functioned as compensation to persons "for their services performed in the
prosecution." Keifer, 1913 WL 988, at *4.Even a pardon would not relieve the defendant of
the duty to pay costs. Id.
299. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d at 381 n.4.
300. See Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1304 (Miss. 1994); see also Pureza, supra note
208, at 831 ("The court reasoned that full review of a conviction was the only way to
maintain its presumption of validity.").
301. Gollott, 646 So. 2d at 1304.
302. Id.
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and how far, to pursue the appeal. 303 For example, a case that involves a
Fourth Amendment search and seizure issue could potentially entail three
levels of appeal from a state trial court-the appeals court, state supreme
court, and the U.S. Supreme Court. Unless the defendant has previously
made an informed statement about how far he or she would wish the appeal
to proceed, the lawyer, or the party standing in his or her place, would
30 4
simply have to guess what the defendant would have wanted.
On a related note, appeals entail costs. 30 5 The substitute party does not
have the same interests as the defendant did and would not necessarily take
the same actions the defendant would have. 30 6 The defendant is, of course,
not available to authorize expenditure of his or her money, which now
makes up the estate. The heirs and next of kin of the defendant are entitled
to the money from the estate. 30 7 To allow a substitute party to be appointed
would allow that person to spend money that is not his or hers.
The court could adopt a rule which would require permission from the
heirs and next of kin to continue an appeal. But, the persons who are
entitled to the proceeds of the estate may be in dispute. It is doubtful that a
court would want to wait for inheritance disputes to be settled before
hearing an appeal.
Another disadvantage of substitution is that the result of an appeal would
be academic. If the appeal results in a new trial, it could not go forward, as
there would be no one to try. 308 No judgment could be effected (barring
fines or restitution) if the appeal were upheld. 30 9 Thus, except in those
cases that involve fines or restitution, there is no practical reason to have an
310
appeal anyway.
3 11
Furthermore, courts have a policy against deciding moot questions.
The reason for this is one of judicial economy-courts should not waste

303. Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1041 (Md. 2006); Sauder, supra note 101, at 37071.
304. See Sauder, supra note 101, at 370-71.
Those who advocate client-centered
lawyering would likely be opposed to substitution. It is the client who provides the scope of

authority to the lawyer in a given matter. See David A. Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors:
A Client-Centered Approach 236-37 (2d ed. 1991). A client must live with the
consequences of the legal action, and the client's money is used to pay the costs, so
advocates of client-centered lawyering entrust clients with control over important decisions.
See id. at 272. It makes little sense, in this view, for a lawyer to take as large a step as to file
up to three appeals on behalf of a client who is not alive to approve of it.
305. Sauder, supra note 101, at 371.
306. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 288 A.2d 741, 745 (Pa. 1972) (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting) ("Does the family, if there is one, have the duty to pick up the case and carry it
forward? If not, is the lawyer who represented the deceased in his lifetime obligated to seek
full appellate review for a non-existent client, and regardless of remuneration for his
services?"); Sauder, supra note 101, at 370-71.
307. See Laura Dietz et al., 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estates § 1 (2006).
308. Surland,895 A.2d at 1042.
309. Id.
310. See id.
311. Walker, 288 A.2d at 744 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); see also 5 Wayne R. LaFave et
al., Criminal Procedure §27.5(a) (3d ed. 2000).
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scarce resources on appeals that would have no practical effect. 3 12
3 13
Therefore, the defendant could never get vindication of his position.
E. Option 5: Dismiss the Appeal with an Acknowledgment of Its Existence
(PermanentNon-disposition)
Alabama is the lone state that requires an acknowledgment of an appeal
in the trial record, but then dismisses that appeal as moot. 3 14 This rule was
adopted in Wheat v. State,3 15 in which the defendant pleaded guilty to five
counts of capital murder and received the death penalty. 3 16 He died after
filing an appeal with the appeals court. 3 17 Citing a prior abatement case,
the appeals court abated the defendant's case ab initio. 3 18 The state
319
petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for review.
The court held that the precedent relied upon below was procedurally
distinguishable, 320 and declared itself unconstrained by stare decisis in
determining abatement policy. 32 1 The court recognized that the decision
regarding which doctrine to adopt is a "difficult choice[]." 322 It could either
abate the conviction, which would presume that the appeal would have been
successful, or it could leave the conviction in place and deprive the
32 3
defendant of his right to review of his conviction.
Choosing what the court referred to as "a mean between the two
extremes," it articulated the following rule:
[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals shall instruct the trial court to place in
the record a notation stating that the fact of the defendant's conviction
removed the presumption of the defendant's innocence, but that the
conviction was appealed and it was neither affirmed nor reversed on

312. Walker, 288 A.2d at 745 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
313. See State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411,417 (Wis. 1988) (Day, J., dissenting).
314. See Surland,895 A.2d at 1036. It is fairly evident that this method is essentially the
same as non-abatement, other than the fact that the appeal is acknowledged in the record.
315. 907 So. 2d 461 (Ala. 2005) (per curiam).
316. Id.at461.
317. Id.

318. Id. at 461-62 (citing Ex Parte Estate of Cook, 848 So. 2d 916 (Ala. 2002)).
319. Id. at461.
320. That case, Estate of Cook, involved a motion for a trial de novo in the circuit court,
from the judgment of a municipal court. Id. at 462. A trial de novo necessarily annuls the
previous conviction and gives the defendant a fresh trial in the higher circuit court. Id. If a
defendant dies awaiting such trial, there is no conviction to be enforced against him. See id.
(quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Lancaster, 25 So. 733, 735 (Ala. 1899)). Wheat, by
contrast, involved the direct review of a trial court conviction, which removed his
presumption of innocence. See id. at 462.
321. See id. at 462-63.
322. Id. at 462.
323. See id.
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the appeal of the conviction was
appeal because the defendant died while
324
pending and the appeal was dismissed.
Essentially, the effect of this rule is the same as that of non-abatement. The
appeal is not heard and the judgment stands. So why did the court adopt
this rule as "a mean between ... two extremes"? 325 The difference is in
how the justice system treats the conviction. It explicitly refuses to
pronounce the conviction valid, whereas presumably the courts which use
non-abatement (at least implicitly) do.
Possibly, this is a desire by the Alabama Supreme Court to convey just
how difficult the abatement question is. It does not want to say anything
about the validity of a conviction because neither possible disposition is
fully correct, as no appeal could be completed. However, it is doubtful that
anyone will substantially benefit from such a pronouncement, certainly not
the defendant's estate, which would still be as liable for fines and restitution
as if non-abatement were used.
This method renders a case incompletely disposed, like a novel that ends
with plotlines unresolved. This is an unsatisfying result for a system that is
supposed to render final decisions. 326 At least non-abatement declares the
conviction valid and thus reaches a final disposition for the case.
III. SOLUTION: THE ABATEMENT HEARING
A. What's Wrong with the Existing Doctrines?
This Note has discussed five alternative doctrines that courts have used to
resolve the issue of what to do when an appellant dies. There are major
flaws that underlie each alternative. Under each option, either there are
certain cases in which a fair result will not follow, or there are certain
aspects of the option that render it impractical. This Note suggests that a
new approach is necessary to ensure fundamental fairness in all cases.
The flaw of options 1 and 2, discussed in Part II, is the same. Neither
rule produces a fair result in all cases. To illustrate the flaw, imagine two
situations. The first is a case similar to Ken Lay's: An executive commits
fraud and swindles his company's shareholders out of $40 million.327 The
second is the case of a blue-collar factory worker who is arrested for DWI
after a night of drinking.
Why is option 1 flawed? Imagine that these two cases take place in the
same state, for example in Illinois, which uses abatement. 328 If the
executive died after being convicted of fraud, but before appealing, Illinois
324. Id. at 464. Because the court declared the conviction "neither affirmed nor
reversed," the case was essentially left permanently unresolved. See id. Thus, this Note
refers to Alabama's method as the "permanent non-disposition" method.
325. Id. at 464.
326. See Staggs, supra note 65, at 516.
327. See supra Introduction.
328. See People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 664 (Ill. 1999).
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law would abate his conviction and the shareholders could not get their
money back. This would work a major unfairness, as the executive's estate
would get to keep his ill-gotten proceeds. (On the other hand, it would
preserve the executive's right of appeal.)
In the case of the drunk driver, the abatement doctrine is a perfectly fair
course of action. There is no restitution and no identifiable victim. There is
no interest that countervails the drunk driver's right to appeal. The use of
abatement would preserve that right and recognize the futility of sustaining
the conviction.
We can see the similar flaw in option 2 if we move the executive and the
drunk driver to Georgia, which does not use abatement. 329 In this state, the
executive's situation is resolved fairly, with the victims collecting on
restitution based on a presumptively valid conviction. However, the drunk
driver's name is tarred forever with a conviction that may or may not be
based on solid evidence-and for no rational purpose. He has effectively
been deprived of his right of appeal, and no one is made better off because
of it. The executive's right to appeal, on the other hand, yields to the
victim's arguably stronger right to restitution.
Neither rule produces a fair result in both cases. This is because the
composition of interests is different in both. Why should the court use the
same rule in both cases if this is true?
Some courts choose to apply neither rule but instead attempt to enforce a
compromise. 330 As this Note has detailed, there are three "compromise"
positions (options 3, 4, and 5). These positions suffer from major flaws that
suggest a better approach could be found.
Option 3, the Dudley compromise where restitution is preserved and the
other aspects of the conviction abated, is an incomplete compromise. 331 It
would fail to protect other interests valued by the victims and society, such
as the interest in condemnation of someone who has done wrong. 332 Thus,
in cases involving a particularly heinous crime, it would undesirably result
in the proclamation of the defendant's innocence. 333
Option 4, substitution, is disadvantageous because it forces the court and
the estate to waste money on an essentially moot question-the appeal on
the merits. 334 The money spent doing this would belong to others not a
party to the case. 335 The heirs and next of kin would be unfairly burdened
by such a rule.

329. See generally Taylor v. State, 72 S.E. 898 (Ga. 1911) (articulating Georgia's policy
on abatement for the first time).
330. See supra Part II.C-E.
331. See supra notes 247-62 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 277-86 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
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Using option 5, permanent non-disposition, has the exact same practical
result as using option 2.336 The explicit refusal to affirm or deny the
conviction would be of little comfort to the defendant's estate, which is
treated as if the conviction were valid. 337 Use of this option leaves the case
permanently unresolved, which is not an ideal policy for a court of law.
In sum, no one existing rule can efficiently produce a fair and complete
result for all parties in all cases. This is true because the interests are, of
course, different in all cases. There is no restitution in some cases. Some
crimes are a cause of social outrage, while others are conduct crimes with
no victims. The solution to this problem must be flexible enough to
account for each case's unique allocation of interests.
B. The Solution
The optimal solution to this problem must first, be able to take into
account each interest involved in a case proportional to such interest's
magnitude. Second, it must come to a resolution as quickly as possible so
as not to waste precious judicial resources. Third, it must either abate
338
everything in full or fully preserve the conviction and judgment.
1. The Abatement Hearing
If, after a defendant has been convicted, he or she dies before having an
opportunity to pursue an appeal of right, the following procedure should
take place. If the court of appeals has jurisdiction already, it should remand
the matter to the trial court. If no appeal has yet been filed, the trial court
should retain jurisdiction. The trial court should then conduct a short
hearing. 339 At this hearing, the attorney for the decedent should continue to
represent him or her. The purpose of the hearing would be to detennine
whether the case against the decedent should be abated ab initio or whether
the conviction should be allowed to stand as final. There would be no third
option. The court should hear evidence, including witness testimony, if
necessary.
Due to the fact that these cases have differing allocations of opposing
interests, the court should not use a per se rule. Instead, the court should
consider and balance four factors to determine which option to take. The
first two factors should carry greater weight than the final two. Each of the
336. See supra note 314.
337. See supra Part II.E.

338. Either the defendant's interest in review of his or her conviction will prevail, or the
victim's interest in restitution and retribution will. See supra Part I.C. These are the only
two dispositions consistent with logic, and thus they are the ideal dispositions. It makes little
sense to say that a conviction is abated ab initio (does not exist) but the defendant still has
some duty arising out of it (such as the obligation to pay restitution). They are also both
final resolutions to the case, leaving nothing unresolved. This serves society's and the
courts' interest in efficient administration of justice. See supra Part I.C.4-5.
339. The purpose of having a short and final hearing is to minimize the amount of time
and resources courts spend on moot cases such as these. See supra Part I.C.5.
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four factors is intended to represent one or more of the important interests
that exist in the abatement context.
2. The Four-Factor Test
a. Presenceand Amount of Restitution
The first factor to be considered is whether there is (or would likely be)
an order of restitution attached to the conviction. If there is such an order,
the court should take into consideration the amount involved. The presence
of restitution should, of course, militate against abatement. The greater the
amount, the greater the weight against abatement should be. The lack of
any restitution should weigh in favor of abatement. This factor is included
340
in the test, of course, to represent a victim's interest in restitution.
The potential loss of restitution is one of the signature injustices of the
abatement doctrine. Restitution exists as a means to force the criminal to
compensate the crime victim for his or her economic loss. 34 1 Where there
are multiple victims or a large amount of money is involved, the court
should be reluctant to deny the restitution that would flow from a
presumptively valid conviction. A person convicted of a crime is presumed
guilty until such person can convince an appellate court to throw out the
342
conviction.
b. Heinousness of the Crime
Second, the court should consider the heinousness of the offense in its
particular locality. Crimes that involve a high level of moral depravity,
such as child molestation, rape, and terrorism, should have the second
factor weigh against abatement. Conversely, victimless crimes, such as
drug use or DWI not resulting in injury, should have the second factor
militate in favor of abatement. The second factor should also weigh more
heavily against abatement the greater the sentence given for the offense.
This factor is included to represent the victim's interest in "closure" and
34 3
society's interest in deterring crime.
As the cases of Salvi and Geoghan demonstrate, 344 application of
abatement can lead to massive public outrage and reopen wounds felt by
victims and their families. Courts should hesitate to use judicial policy to
inflict emotional distress. A guilty verdict, as this Note has mentioned, 34 5

340. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. Of course, the purpose of
restitution, whether to punish or to make the victim whole, is controversial. See generally
Kleinhaus, supra note 121 (discussing the conflict in the federal courts on this question).
342. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1993).
343. See supra notes 190, 194-95 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 277-86 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 277-86 and accompanying text.
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represents more than a license to punish a defendant; it represents societal
condemnation of what the defendant has done. It signifies that justice has
been done. The court should not cavalierly erase that justice because of a
technicality.
There is no reason to uphold a conviction, of course, when no one has
been victimized by the defendant's actions.
By comparison, the
defendant's loss of his right to appeal is greater than the harm to society of
erasing the conviction (all other considerations being equal, of course).
c. Involvement of Victims
Third, the court should consider the level of involvement and interest of
the victims and their families in the outcome of the case. The greater their
participation in the trial (including actions such as attending court, giving
victim-impact statements, and testifying at trial), the more this factor should
weigh against abatement. The third factor, like the second factor, should
weigh in favor of abatement when there is no identifiable victim. This is
included to account for any heightened interest of the particular victim
above and beyond the general interest of victims protected by the second
factor.
Even if society itself would not necessarily be outraged by abatement of
a particular conviction, the court should consider the potential outrage on a
more localized level. It should not disregard victims or families of victims
who have felt genuine pain and hurt from the actions of the defendant and
who have expressed it in a measurable way. Conversely, if victims have
made peace with how they have been wronged, or fail to show a real
interest in the developments in the defendant's trial, abatement would not
be as much of an injustice.
d. Effect on Decedent's Family, Heirs, and Next of Kin
Finally, the court should consider any negative effect of the conviction
on the decedent's family, heirs, and next of kin. 346 If these people are
destitute or public charges, then this factor should militate in favor of
abatement if restitution or fines are involved. 347 Also, if the presence of the
346. This factor should not be construed to say, for example, the higher the restitution

payment, the harsher the effect on the heirs and next of kin. This is an examination of
circumstances specific to these family members of the decedent, rather than the effect the
decedent's actions have had on his family. For example, under this factor, the court would
consider that the defendant's mother recently went bankrupt from catastrophic medical
expenses. It would not consider the fact that the defendant was ordered to pay $1 million in
restitution, and that payment of such restitution from the estate would deprive an otherwise
financially stable heir of a large sum of money.
347. This is also a consideration for family courts in deciding whether to enforce a
prenuptial agreement. Courts are reluctant to enforce agreements that would result in a
spouse being placed on the public dole. See, e.g., Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594, 599
(N.D. 2004) (citing a provision of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act adopted by the
North Dakota legislature).
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conviction has a negative social or economic effect on a family member, 34 8
it should weigh in favor of abatement. If the family members showed
strong support for the defendant and maintained he or she was innocent, this
should be taken into account. This is meant to account for the interest
of
349
the defendant's family in avoiding punishment they do not deserve.
As has been said numerous times, the purpose of the criminal law is not
to punish the defendant's family. 3 50 The court should bear that rationale in
mind when considering this factor. If the heirs and next of kin would,
absent the inheritance, be public charges, then society has an interest in
transferring the estate to them. Such interest may outweigh the victim's
interest in restitution. 35 1 It would probably outweigh society's interest in
collecting a fine that is purely for punishment of the defendant.
The final two factors individually should weigh less heavily than the first
two factors individually. If the first two factors do not clearly call for one
352
option or the other, the final two can be used to tip the balance.
2. The Determination
After hearing arguments and evidence related to the four factors, the
court should issue a ruling that will either order abatement ab initio or
dismissal of the appeal as moot with preservation of the conviction. It shall

348. The government is not heartless toward the effects of the criminal justice system on
defendants' families. The federal sentencing guidelines will consider whether a defendant's
"extraordinary family circumstances" warrant a reduced sentence, and such "downward
departures" have been upheld. See generally Jason Binimow, Annotation, Downward
Departurefrom United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 1A1.1 et seq.) Based on
ExtraordinaryFamily Circumstances, 145 A.L.R. Fed. 559 (1998). One such extraordinary
circumstance depends on whether the defendant is the "sole or primary provider[]." Id. §3(a).
A second relates to a possible "extraordinary effect" that incarceration of the defendant may
have upon his or her child. Id. §4(a).
349. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
351. If the victim or the victim's family has not demonstrated a great personal interest in
assisting with prosecuting or otherwise participating in trial, it would demonstrate to the
court that the victim or family member places a low value on the restitution.
352. For example, consider if Osama bin Laden were brought to trial for the September
11th attacks, convicted, and ordered to pay restitution to the victims. If he were murdered in
prison before filing an appeal, there would be no need to look at the final two factors, as the
first two factors would clearly show that abatement should not be invoked. Flying planes
into inhabited buildings is clearly a heinous crime, and the amount of restitution bin Laden
would be ordered to repay would be staggering. There would be no way, in this situation,
that factors three and four could sway the balance the other way. Conversely, if a police
officer discovers marijuana in the car of the defendant during a constitutionally questionable
traffic stop, the situation would be the opposite. If the defendant is convicted and challenges
the traffic stop in the appeals court, and then dies in the middle of the process, the two
factors would weigh so heavily for abatement that it would be a waste of time to consider the
final two factors. There would be no restitution owed, and simple marijuana possession can
hardly be equated with a heinous offense such as terrorism. Many times judges will
encounter no clear result from the first two factors. Maybe there is some restitution and the
crime was moderately reprehensible. The purpose of factors three and four is, of course, to
tip the balance in situations such as these.
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include findings of fact based on the hearing. The court should explain its
findings in relation to all four factors, and it shall explain its reasoning
based on consideration of each factor and the weight it gave to each.
3. Review
The losing party should be allowed to appeal the decision of the trial
court. The appeals court may overrule the decision only if it is clearly
erroneous based on the findings of fact, or if the findings of fact or the
reasoning is inadequate. This should be designed to make an appeal as
unattractive as possible, while preserving the ability of a higher court to
overrule any patently illogical decision.
C. Advantages of the Abatement Hearing
The abatement hearing option, as an alternative to the current five
blanket-rule options, has three main advantages.
1. Flexibility
The court would be empowered to consider evidence related to four
factors that represent the different interests involved in the appeal of a
criminal case. Because each case involves different interests to different
degrees, this approach gives judges the flexibility to arrive at whichever
solution would produce the fairest result in the situation. The judge would
be empowered to account for the unique circumstances of each case.
2. Efficiency
Once the client is dead, it is in the best interest of the judicial system to
resolve the situation as quickly as possible. Continuing the appeal on the
merits would have little benefit, and whatever judgment came out of it
could only be enforced in a limited way (restitution and fines). Rather than
forcing an attorney to spend hours crafting legal briefs and preparing for
arguments on the merits of a moot appeal, it is more efficient to have a
short hearing at the trial level-after which restitution and fines could also
be collected. Obviously it is not as efficient as applying a per se rule, but it
is desirable to forego some efficiency in the name of ensuring greater
fairness.
3. Finality
The result of the abatement hearing can only be one of two
dispositions-abatement ab initio or dismissal of the appeal and
preservation of the conviction. Whichever option is chosen, the case will
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be over, and no more time or resources will have to be spent on it. Also,
353
the disposition will not be logically inconsistent.
D. Disadvantages
No solution to any complex problem is perfect, and this Note does not
aver that the abatement hearing option is any different. It is important to
address disadvantages for two reasons. One, it identifies the areas in which
the solution may need to be improved. Two, it helps to demonstrate the
strength of the plan if the disadvantages can be minimized.
1. High Level of Judicial Discretion
Because this solution uses a flexible multifactor test with a relatively
vague weighing system, the test would entail a substantial degree of judicial
discretion. The test essentially encourages the use of guided intuition to
arrive at a fair result. Obviously judges have certain biases. As such, there
would be a high level of uncertainty about what the court would do outside
of a few very obvious situations.
There are a couple of features that help to mitigate this problem. First,
the court is required to make findings of fact and explain in detail its
analysis of the situation based on the test. This prevents completely
arbitrary rulings by allowing the parties to examine the judge's reasoning.
Second, there is a level of appellate review that is designed to overrule the
decision only if it is based on inadequate findings of fact or if the
conclusion is clearly erroneous.
2. Questionable Attorney Incentive
This solution runs into the same problem that continuing the appeal with
a substitute party would entail-the attorney would essentially be
representing someone who could not make authorizations as to his or her
actions. 354 There would be no client to make sure the attorney is acting in
his best interest. Further, the hearing would still entail costs, which would
have to be paid from the estate.
This procedure is superior to continuing the appeal because it is designed
to be shorter in duration and require less complex legal argument than an
appeal (the test is designed to be intuitive, thus the arguments will be more
equity-based rather than legalistic). Thus, it should save both money and
time, lessening the damage.
3. Need to Take Evidence and Have Appellate Review
Appling a multifactor test after a factual hearing, in terms of time and
effort, is more costly than applying a blanket rule to every situation. The
353. See supra note 337.
354. See supra Part II.D.
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fact that this ruling must have a layer of appellate review above it to prevent
irrational decisions also increases its costliness. However, the degree of
fairness returned in exchange for these efforts makes the abatement hearing
worth the effort. It would be more beneficial overall to society if the Justice
Department could have a short hearing before Judge Lake about the
disposition of Ken Lay's case rather than applying a blanket rule and
denying thousands of people their justly deserved restitution without batting
an eyelash. Each case is unique, and if the court system must take a bit
more time and expend a bit more energy to take that into account, so be it.
CONCLUSION
Ever since the state first took responsibility for the prosecution of
criminal law and began to protect the rights it had granted to criminal
defendants through the appeals process, courts have needed an answer to
what should happen when a defendant, by his or her death, loses an
opportunity to make an appeal of right. Most courts recognized the
primarily punitive nature of criminal law and reasoned that a dead
defendant need not stand convicted. In a criminal law regime that excluded
the interests of those victimized by crime from protection, this was a
perfectly logical solution.
Proponents of victims' rights began, in the late-twentieth century, to have
a greater influence on the philosophy behind criminal law. Soon, criminal
law became about more than punishment; it became about justice for those
who had been harmed. The introduction of this new set of interests into the
equation turned what was, frankly, an obvious policy of abatement into a
doctrine that could potentially work a massive injustice. This led to a
rebellion in many of the states, manifested by decisions overturning decades
of precedent and the adoption of one of four alternative doctrines that exist
today.
Some courts simply shifted to non-abatement and would uphold the
conviction. Others declined to abandon the interest of the decedent in the
appeals process and decided to compromise. Some of these compromisers
kept restitution orders, abating the rest of the conviction. Others allowed
another person to substitute for the defendant and pursue the appeal.
Alabama stood alone in declaring the case permanently indisposed while
not vacating the judgment.
These are all per se rules that are supposed to be applied to cases with
differing interests with differing intensities. This is analogous to trying to
force many differently shaped pegs into a round hole. To achieve what is
truly fair, courts need a flexible, low-cost procedure that takes the interests
of all parties into account for each situation.
For this purpose, the
abatement hearing option is ideal. The judge would consider four factors,
which he or she would balance together to reach the fairest result, case by
case. Courts should work to maximize the level of fairness and justice that
comes out of the criminal justice system. No per se rule can do that.
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In the case of Ken Lay, the court would likely have found that no
abatement should take place under the abatement hearing method. If Judge
Lake were allowed to consider all the interests at play, he would have been
empowered to reach the fairest result based on common sense. Then, the
Ken Hortons of the world could have finally received the justice they
welcomed on May 25, 2006.

